Public service broadcasting of sport, shows, and news as economic solution to the voter's paradox of rational ignorance. by Rothbauer, Julia & Sieg, Gernot
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Public service broadcasting of sport,
shows, and news as economic solution to
the voter’s paradox of rational ignorance.
Julia Rothbauer and Gernot Sieg
Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig
2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27190/
MPRA Paper No. 27190, posted 3. December 2010 20:46 UTC
Public Service Broadcasting of Sport, Shows, and 
News as Economic Solution to the Voter's Paradox 
of Rational Ignorance
by
Julia Rothbauer and Gernot Sieg
Economics Department Working Paper Series
No 9
October 2010
Institut für 
Volkswirtschaftslehre
© Technische Universität Braunschweig, 
Economics Department, 2010 
 
Address 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
Spielmannstraße 9 
D38106 Braunschweig, Germany 
 
Telephone 
+49 531 391 2578 
 
Website 
http://www.tu-braunschweig.de/vwl 
 
Fax 
+49 531 391 2593 
 
All rights reserved. 
 
Any reproduction, publication and reprint in 
the form of a different publication, whether 
printed or produced electronically, in whole 
or in part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the TU 
Braunschweig, Economics Department, or 
the author(s). 
 
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Economics 
Department or the TU Braunschweig. 
 
The Working Paper Series seeks to 
disseminate economic research work by the 
TU Braunschweig Economics Department’s 
staff and visitors. Papers by researchers not 
affiliated with the TU Braunschweig 
Economics Department may also be 
considered for publication to the extent that 
they have been presented at research 
seminars/workshops organised by the 
Department.  
The working papers published in the Series 
constitute work in progress circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comments. 
Views expressed represent exclusively the 
authors' own opinions. 
The Series is managed by the Director of the 
Economics Department, and an Editorial 
Board oversees the process of publication. 
Public Service Broadcasting of Sport, Shows, and
News as Economic Solution to the Voter’s
Paradox of Rational Ignorance
Julia Rothbauer
Gernot Sieg
October 18, 2010
Abstract
Rational individuals may use a Public Service TV channel as a welfare
improving institution to solve the paradox of being uninformed. To induce
voters to watch unbiased serious informational content the Public Service
TV channel is not only broadcasting (unbiased serious) news but also sport
and shows even though in many markets sport and shows are broadcasted
by private TV channels. Our approach is based on two-sided markets and
the assumption of decreasing marginal returns of the factor information in
the production process of democratic decisions.
JEL: L82; D72; L32
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1 Introduction
A central paradox in the rational choice approach of politics is that voters know
that democracy works better if people are well informed but no rational voter is
willing to collect such kind of information in a costly manner. As Downs (1957,
p. 246) writes: “(1) rational citizens want democracy to work well so as to gain its
benefits, and it works best when the citizenry is well-informed; and (2) it is indi-
vidually irrational to be well-informed.” Since then both propositions, known as
the paradox of rational ignorance, were challenged by many authors but have not
been disproved until now. Wittman (1989) argues that informational problems in
democratic markets are being exaggerated and democracy works even if voters are
not well informed. If voters do not systematically err and if there are at least some
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people who know the right answer, then the incorrect votes cancel out and an op-
timal solution is found. The so-called “wisdom of the crowds” (Surowiecki, 2004)
is impressive even if each crowd member’s knowledge is completely unimpressive.
However, if voters’ errors are systematic, the informational gap of the voters ag-
gregates to wrong decisions. Concerning rational ignorance, the question is not
whether the crowd in “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?” unsystematically errs in
answering the question “Which group score number one in the UK single charts
on April 4th, 2010?”, but whether voters systematically err in questions of direct
political relevance like “How high should a minimum wage be?”. Caplan (2002)
shows that for economic questions, arguably the foremost important political ques-
tions, the opinion of voters systematically diﬀer from the opinion of economists.
The average voter, for example, does not see the link between excessive high wages
and unemployment.
Some people get economic information as a by-product of their professional
(and paid) work; other people gather this kind of information just for fun. However,
if you are not a professional economist or an economics fan, gathering information
is costly and earnings are questionable. Costs are predominantly opportunity
costs of time to consume such kind of information. Earnings are negligible when
the information is used only to improve a voting decision where the probability
that the vote is decisive is insignificant. Because of the irrelevance of a single vote,
even utility decreasing decisions bear no private costs. For example, a high-income
earner can easily vote for high income taxes because she knows that her vote does
not change the outcome of the vote.
Controlling for all other variables, two activities prevent systematic errors of
voters: education and economic training. More educated voters and more econom-
ically trained voters share opinions that are closer to the expert’s opinion (Caplan,
2002). The opportunity costs of popular misconceptions about economics are large
because they concern all fields of economic policy. Because the crowd systemati-
cally is at fault regarding economics, better informed and educated people improve
the outcome of the democratic process and therefore reach better economic poli-
cies.
In addition to the paradox of rational ignorance there is the paradox of voting
(Downs, 1957): Because the chance of exercising the pivotal vote is tiny, the costs of
voting will normally exceed the expected benefits and therefore a utility maximizer
does not vote. If nobody votes, democracy does not work. There is much empirical
evidence that voter turnout rises with information and education (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone, 1980; Matsusaka and Palda, 1999) and empirical estimates by Lassen
(2005) confirm a sizable and statistically significant causal eﬀect of being informed
on the propensity to vote. Gentzkow (2006) shows that substitution of media with
diﬀerent grades of political coverages provides a plausible mechanism linking media
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supply and voting. He shows that television caused fewer voters to go to the polls.
This eﬀect was particularly strong in those elections where the drop in information
caused by little coverage of the poll’s topics by television was shown to be the
largest. Furthermore, utility-maximizing consumers receive higher payoﬀs from
voting and therefore vote with higher probability when they are more confident
of their vote choice (Matsusaka, 1995). To summarize, democracy works better if
more people are informed. For the paradox of rational ignorance this is because
better informed voters make better decisions; for the paradox of voting this is
because better informed citizens are more likely to vote.
If the production of the public good democracy is eﬃcient, public production
financed by taxes may be the solution to the free rider problem. However, the
costs of production of any physical information (pdf, TV, film) are not the only
costs that accrue in the process of supplying democracy. An individual has to
pay another type of costs: he has to spend time to consume the information.
Therefore, even if information is provided for free (free-to-air Public or Private
TV, free downloads from the Internet), it is still rational not to use them because
the consumption generates opportunity costs of time a rational voter is not willing
to bear.
Sometimes the problem that a welfare-enhancing institution depends on the
time input of the citizen is solved by law. Compulsory school attendance is usual
in many countries and produces a minimum quality standard of informed citizens.
However, information is getting out of date and after some years the stock of
information learned in school is not a proper base to participate in regular elec-
tions. Updates are necessary, but some voters are not willing to voluntarily pay
the price of time. Compulsory school attendance for voters, for example eight
hours before each election, however, is not feasible: it is expensive, ineﬀective, not
constitutional, and not focused.
A traditional strategy adopted by broadcasters to attract viewers for less pop-
ular content is to broadcast this content as a follow-up of very popular content
(Armstrong and Weeds, 2007). The strategy to schedule an unpopular program
between two popular ones is called “Hammocking” and could be used to encourage
consumers to watch more informational programs. However, this strategy loses ef-
fect where many diﬀerent channels are broadcasted since consumers may switch
to a more entertaining channel.
Another strategy is to place informational messages, for example about the risk
of investing all savings in only one asset, within popular game shows. However,
game shows including informational content may be less entertaining than com-
peting game shows. The “product placement” strategy of including informational
messages into shows also suﬀers from the competition of channels.
But in spite of the competition of channels, the advertising industry is still
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able to get attention and time from consumers. They are using two-sided markets
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006) by subsidizing consumer products as
films and TV shows in exchange for the time consumers spend watching their
commercials. We show that this approach can be used as a blue print to solve
the voter’s paradox of being uninformed. Consumers are willing to spend time for
watching serious news if it is in between a broadcast of the cup final. Therefore,
as private TV channels send films, shows and sport to get its commercials seen, a
Public Service TV channel may send “Back to the future”, “NCIS”, and the cup
final to get their news and public information programs seen.
We show that rational individuals of a society may use Public Service Broad-
casting as a welfare improving institution to solve the paradox of rationally being
uninformed. Therefore, our result adds to the discussion whether Public Service
Broadcasting is a worthwhile institution (Armstrong, 2005). In the literature there
are three traditional rationales for Public Service Broadcasting (Brown, 1996). The
first is that the welfare of viewers is enhanced by programs that would not be sup-
plied in response to market demand, for example a Shakespeare play or a Wagner
opera. This argument is paternalistic and does not convince if consumers are
sovereign. The second argument is an infant industry argument: consumers need
a supply of quality programs to build their preferences about quality. This may
hold for high-quality serious news, but not for broadcasting sport and shows. Last
but not least there could be a market failure in the broadcasting market. The
current approaches searching for failures in the market for broadcasting usually
look at consumers with heterogenous preferences for diﬀerent type of programs,
the platform (channel) firms, and the advertising industry (Anderson and Coate,
2005; Armstrong, 2005). Anderson and Coate (2005) show that equilibrium ad-
vertising levels can be above or below socially optimal levels because producers do
not fully internalize the nuisance costs of advertisements. Furthermore, markets
can provide too few or too many programs. These arguments would justify the
regulation of the broadcasting market, for example through commercial ceilings
or the introduction of a Public Service TV channel broadcasting only a type of
program that is not provided by the market.
Another argument in favor of Public Service TV is that because people hold
beliefs which they like to see confirmed and media outlets can slant stories toward
these beliefs, news are biased and Public Service TV should correct this bias
by oﬀering unbiased information. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) show that
on topics where peoples’ beliefs diverge such as politically decisive issues, media
outlets segment the market and slant toward extreme positions. However, because
access to all news sources provides an unbiased perspective in the aggregate, they
do not see a failure of the market for news and therefore no need for news supplied
by a public firm.
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In addition, many authors (Downs, 1957; Coase, 1974; Posner, 1986; von Ha-
gen and Seabright, 2007, p. 6) argue that consumers value politically relevant
information less than a social planner would do and that a first best outcome re-
quires encouraging consumption of news. But in competitive markets, firms have
to oﬀer what consumers want, i.e. no or soft news. Hamilton (2004) provides evi-
dence that the quantity of policy news on U.S. network television news has fallen,
arguably because regulatory controls were loosened and competition from cable
intensified. The policymaker who prefers completely private broadcasting could
think about lessening competition in the media market. However, Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2008) balance this argument against the traditional case for competitive
news markets like increasing diversity of owner incentives and preserving press in-
dependence and summarize that limiting competition is not a persuasive solution
to the problem of rational ignorance. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) point out that
not only the supply of hard news could be increased but also that the supply of
more entertaining news should be limited.
All mentioned arguments indicate that welfare could be enhanced through the
broadcasting of unbiased serious news or a type of program that is not provided
by private TV channels. While focusing on the fact that voters free-ride on in-
formation, and therefore consume less information than socially desirable, and
emphasizing the opportunity costs of time voters incur by processing information,
we show that a Public Service TV channel, that is broadcasting news and informa-
tion only, may not be the optimal solution for the problem of rational ignorance.
We show that the optimal institution to induce voters to watch unbiased seri-
ous informational content may be a Public Service TV channel which is not only
broadcasting unbiased serious news but also sport and shows.
2 The model
The number of voters is normalized to one; we denote an individual voter as
i ∈ [0, 1] and the amount of information voter i possesses as Ii.
We call the output of a democratic process Y , with Y ≥ 0 and a larger Y
implying a better decision and assume that information I is the only factor of
production. Because of universal suﬀrage each voter equally influences the pro-
duction of Y through his amount of information, i.e. two voters i, j ∈ [0, 1] who
share the same amount of information Ii = Ij have the same marginal product
∂Y/∂Ii = ∂Y/∂Ij. Therefore, there exists a function g : [0, 1] → R such that
Y =
￿ 1
0 gi(Ii)di. We assume that marginal information has a non-negative eﬀect
on the decision, either because information improves participation or because in-
formation results in a more adequate vote. Furthermore, we assume a diminishing
marginal product of information. A minute of additional information is much more
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useful for a voter who is quite uninformed than for a voter who has already a large
stock of information. Therefore, we define the output of the democratic process as
Y =
￿ 1
0
Iαi di
where 0 < α < 1 determines how fast the marginal productivity of information
diminishes. If we assumed a constant marginal product of information (α = 1),
our model would reproduce the standard welfare economics policy implication
that a Public Service TV channel only has to broadcast programs for minorities,
education for children, serious news, and dramas which no private channel wants
to show (Armstrong, 2005; Solberg, 2007).
The media part of our model follows Anderson and Coate (2005). There are
three types of TV programs. First, a TV channel may broadcast entertaining
shows, where the broadcasting time of shows is denoted by ts ∈ [0, 1]. Second, a
TV channel may broadcast informatory programs like newscasts, features about
science, or economics etc. where the broadcasting time of information program is
denoted by tinf ∈ [0, 1]. And finally, a TV channel may broadcast commercials,
where broadcasting time of television advertising is denoted by ta ∈ [0, 1].
Each voter i watches television for one unit of time. Voters are heterogeneous in
their preferences for shows and information. No voter likes television advertising.
Therefore the utility from commercials is assumed to be zero and the utility of
voter i from TV consumption is
Ui = its + 1/2tinf .
The show-type consumers i > 1/2 prefer shows over information and the information-
type consumers i < 1/2 prefer information. Depending on i the utility diﬀerences
between an additional show or an additional informational broadcast is i− 1/2.
We assume that consumers do not switch channels but watch the utility maxi-
mizing TV channel. For simplicity we assume that there are only two TV channels,
a show channel and an information channel. The show channel does not broadcast
any informational program and the information channel does not broadcast any
show program. This is consistent with a TV market that, because of high fixed
costs, only bears two channels. In this case it is a Nash-Equilibrium strategy,
i.e. no other type of program can increase the market share to focus on one type of
consumers. Because of our assumption that both groups of consumers are equal,
the market share is one half.
We normalize the pre-TV information of each voter to zero, such that a positive
I is only reached by watching informational programs on TV. Therefore, a voter
who watches channel ch possesses Ii = tchinf information.
For TV channels we assume that the time of broadcasting commercials ta > 0 is
exogenously given. In many countries advertising ceilings are imposed (Motta and
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Polo, 1997; Anderson, 2007), and in Europe the directive 2007/65/EC concerning
the pursuit of television broadcasting activities rules in Article 18 (1): “The pro-
portion of television advertising spots and teleshopping spots within a given clock
hour shall not exceed 20 %.” We assume that legal ceilings are fully utilized.
Without Public Service TV all consumers of type 1/2 ≤ i ≤ 1 watch shows only
and have information of Ii = 0 whereas information-type consumers 0 ≤ i < 1/2
receive information of an amount of Ii = (1 − ta). Therefore, the output of the
democratic process yields Y = (1− ta)α/2.
We now consider the introduction of a Public Service TV channel that is broad-
casting no commercials but information and shows. Assuming an information
broadcasting time denoted by tp ∈ [0, 1], the remaining broadcasting time of the
Public Service TV channel is used for shows so that the broadcasting time for
shows yields 1− tp.
Former information channel viewers, that is information-type consumers 0 ≤
i < 1/2, switch to the Public Service TV channel if
i(1− tp) + 1/2tp ≥ 1/2(1− ta).
Therefore, all i with
1/2 > i ≥ 1− ta − tp
2(1− tp)
def
= i1s (1)
are the new information-type Public Service TV channel viewers.
Thus, for 1 − tp ≤ ta, all information-type consumers switch over and Ii = tp
for all 0 ≤ i < 1/2. If 1− tp > ta, then
1/2− 1− ta − tp
2(1− tp) =
ta
2(1− tp) (2)
information-type consumers switch. Then Ii = tp for i1s ≤ i < 1/2 and Ii = 1− ta
for 0 ≤ i < i1s.
Former show channel consumers, that is show-type consumers 1/2 ≤ i ≤ 1,
switch to the Public Service TV channel if
i(1− tp) + 1/2tp ≥ i(1− ta).
This holds for ta ≥ tp/2, meaning all show-type consumers 1/2 ≤ i ≤ 1 switch.
Then Ii = tp for all 1/2 ≤ i ≤ 1.
If ta < tp/2, all
i ≤ −tp
2(ta − tp) =
tp
2(tp − ta)
def
= i2s
switch over, i.e.
i2s − 1/2 =
tp
2(tp − ta) − 1/2 =
ta
2(tp − ta) (3)
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are the number of show type switchers. Then Ii = tp for 1/2 < i ≤ i2s and Ii = 1−ta
for i2s < i ≤ 1.
We can now distinguish four possible outcomes for the introduction of Public
Service TV (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Regions I to IV
First, all former information consumers and, at the same time, some former
show channel consumers switch to the Public Service TV channel if ta ≤ 1/3 and
tp ≥ 1− ta or ta ≥ 1/3 and tp ≥ 2ta (Region I). In this case
Y = 1/2tαp +
ta
2(tp − ta)t
α
p =
t1+αp
2(tp − ta) . (4)
Therefore, a Public Service TV channel broadcasting a fraction tp of information
changes Y in Region I by
∆Y1 = 1/2
￿
t1+αp
tp − ta − (1− ta)
α
￿
. (5)
Second, all consumers switch to the Public Service TV channel if ta ≥ 1/3 and
1− ta ≤ tp ≤ 2ta (Region II). In this case
Y = tαp . (6)
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Therefore
∆Y2 = t
α
p − 1/2(1− ta)α. (7)
Third, some former information channel consumers and, at the same time, all
former show channel consumers switch to the Public Service TV channel if ta ≤ 1/3
and tp ≤ 2ta or ta ≥ 1/3 and tp ≤ 1− ta (Region III). In this case
Y =
1− ta − tp
2(1− tp) (1− ta)
α +
ta
2(1− tp)t
α
p + 1/2t
α
p . (8)
Therefore
∆Y3 =
(1− tp)tαp + ta(tαp − (1− ta)α)
2(1− tp) . (9)
And fourth, some former information channel consumers and some former show
channel consumers switch if ta ≤ 1/3 and 2ta ≤ tp ≤ 1 − ta (Region IV). In this
case
Y =
1− ta − tp
2(1− tp) (1− ta)
α +
ta
2(1− tp)t
α
p +
ta
2(tp − ta)t
α
p . (10)
Therefore
∆Y4 = 1/2
￿
tαp + ta
￿
(1− ta)α
tp − 1 + t
α
p
￿
1
1− tp +
1
tp − ta
￿￿￿
. (11)
Simple calculation shows that∆Y is continuous, i.e. ∆Yi = ∆Yj if the combination
(ta, tp) is an element of Region i as well as of Region j. The Public Service TV
channel chooses (tp, 1− tp) to maximize the change of Y . Let t∗p be the value that
maximizes ∆Y .
Proposition 1 For all 0 < ta ≤ 1/2 there exists an 0 < α∗ < 1 such that
t∗p =
￿
1 if α > α∗ ,
2ta if α ≤ α∗.
For ta > 1/2 the optimal value is t∗p = 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
For ta > 1/2 the intuition for the optimal value t∗p = 1 is as follows. There are
only two alternatives of program design: The Public Service TV channel broad-
casts an amount of information tp with tp > 1 − ta (Region II) or an amount of
information tp with tp < 1− ta (Region III). In Region II all consumers who prefer
information switch to Public Service TV because it broadcasts more information
than the private information channel. Simultaneously, all show-type consumers
switch to Public Sercvice TV because even show-type consumers prefer news over
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commercials that are heavily broadcasted by the private show channel (ta > 1/2).
In Region III, as in Region II, all show-type consumers switch because the frac-
tion of broadcasted shows is larger than in Region II. But in contrast to Region
II only some information-type consumers switch to Public Service TV because it
broadcasts less information than the private information channel. With regard
to the number of new Public Service TV channel viewers, Region III is therefore
dominated by Region II. In addition, for both types of consumers the amount
of information consumption per viewer is larger in Region II. To summarize, the
number of viewers of Public Service TV and the consumption of information per
viewer is larger in Region II, so that Region II dominates Region III in both ways.
Furthermore, in Region II all consumers switch to Public Service TV independent
of the informational share of the program. To maximize the voters’ consumption
of information, the Public Service TV channel therefore sets t∗p = 1 and Public
Service TV is an information-only program.
For 1/3 < ta ≤ 1/2 there are three alternatives. Region III is still dominated by
Region II which therefore has to be compared to Region I, where all information-
type consumers but only some show-type consumers switch. In Region II the
Public Service TV channel is able to set the maximal value tp = 2ta without losing
a viewer. For Region I the optimal tp is not that obvious. For the information-type
consumers the same argument as in ta > 1/2 applies: All consumers switch and
watch more information compared to the amount they would have done watching
the private channel. The highest tp = 1 is the optimum when considering the
information types only. However, in Region I the Public Service TV channel
only attracts a part of the show-type consumers. Furthermore, the number of
newly attracted viewers decreases with an increase in tp. On the other hand,
switchers from the group of show consumers who keep watching the Public Service
TV channel consume more information if tp was increased. This positive eﬀect,
however, cannot compensate the decrease of show consumers. Therefore, the lowest
tp = 2ta is the optimum regarding the show consumers only. The question remains,
which group generates a higher change of the outcome Y . The answer depends
on the value of α. A high value of α means that the productivity of getting
additional information is diminishing at a low rate. For example, with α = 1
an additional minute of information generates the same additional Y in case this
minute is watched by a viewer who has already seen a lot of news as well as in
case this minute is the first minute of information a consumer watches. With a
high α it is therefore not that important which consumers switch and it might be
optimal to set a high tp although some show consumers refrain from switching. In
this case it would be optimal to set t∗p = 1 for a wide range of ta. For a small α it
is important to attract the show consumers because the consumption of additional
information is more eﬃcient for this group. Therefore, in the case of a small α
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it is optimal to set a smaller tp = 2ta for a wide range of ta. To summarize, for
1/3 < ta ≤ 1/2 either tp = 1 or tp = 2ta is optimal, depending on the value of α.
For 0 < ta ≤ 1/3 there are again three alternatives. Region I, III, and IV where
some show-type consumers and some information type of consumers switch.
In Region III it is optimal to set t∗p = 2ta. It is intuitive that this is the optimal
value for the group of show consumers because in this region all show consumers
switch and tp = 2ta is the maximal value within reach. For the group of informa-
tion consumers the positive eﬀect of an increasing tp is not that obvious. In this
region information-type consumers who switch to the Public Service TV channel
watch less information compared to the amount they would have when watching
the private channel. Furthermore, increase in information broadcasting attracts
additional information-type consumers. This eﬀect suggests a low optimal tp in
Region III. Let us consider a certain increase in tp that causes one information-type
consumer to switch to the Public Service TV channel and, therefore, lowering his
information consumption. However, increase in tp reduces the loss of information
of all other information-type consumers who have switched to the Public Service
TV channel. This positive eﬀect may compensate for the loss of information the
additional switcher implies. And in fact, the negative eﬀect generated by one
additional switcher is always compensated by the reduction of loss of the other
switchers. Because for both groups the increase of information broadcasting on
the Public Service TV channel generates positive eﬀects, it is optimal to set the
maximal t∗p = 2ta in Region III.
In Region IV the argument for the information-type consumers remains the
same: regarding these consumers the optimal value is the largest within reach,
t∗p = 1 − ta. But, in contrast to Region III, in Region IV only some show-type
consumers switch to the Public Service TV channel. As already discussed, in this
case an increase in tp eﬀects the show consumers negatively. For every fraction
of a time unit the private channel broadcasts commercials ta, there exists a tp
where the positive eﬀect of an increase of tp generated by the group of informa-
tion consumers exactly compensates the negative eﬀect induced by the group of
show consumers. If tp was further increased, the positive eﬀect for the group of
information consumers would overcompensate the negative eﬀect for the group of
show consumers. If tp was decreased, the positive eﬀect for the group of show
consumers would overcompensate the negative eﬀect for the group of information
consumers. As the appendix shows, the latter case is optimal. It is optimal to
choose the minimal tp = 2ta reachable in Region IV.
In Region I the optimal tp depends on the value of α and is either tp = 1 or
tp = 1 − ta. The intuition is the same as discussed for 1/3 < ta ≤ 1/2. But in
contrast to that case, for 0 < ta ≤ 1/3 the minimal tp in Region I is tp = 1 − ta.
However, this is also the maximal tp in Region IV. It has already been argued that
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tp = 1− ta is dominated by tp = 2ta in Region IV. It follows that for 0 < ta ≤ 1/3
the optimal tp is tp = 1 for a high α and tp = 2ta for a small α. We are now able
to summarize that for 0 < ta ≤ 1 the optimal tp is either tp = 1 or tp = 2ta.
If private channels predominantly broadcast commercials, i.e. ta > 1/2, then
it is optimal to set t∗p = 1. This induces all former information channel consumers
to switch to the Public Service TV channel. Because the Public Service TV chan-
nel broadcasts information only, former information channel consumers now watch
more information and Y increases. Former show channel consumers also switch.
In contrast to watching commercials, watching information generates a positive
utility. For switching show consumers this utility is greater than the utility gener-
ated by the sparse show program on the private channel. The former show channel
consumers also increase Y . Even if some show consumers refrain from switching
(for ta < 1/2), it can be optimal to set tp = 1. But there exists a critical ta for
which it is optimal to set tp = 2ta. If the fraction of commercials ta is small,
i.e. ta < 1/2, the utility of show-type consumers from the consumption of pri-
vate channels is comparatively large and the information only Public Service TV
channel may not compensate for the utility loss caused by missing shows. Thus,
some show consumers refrain from switching. However, depending on the value of
α, it can still be optimal to set tp = 1 since this is the optimum considering the
information-type consumers. To summarize, for each α there exists a critical t∗a so
that it is optimal to set tp = 1 for ta > t∗a and tp = 2ta for ta ≤ t∗a.
From a welfare point of view, we have to weigh the costs of the introduction
of Public Service TV against its benefits. The costs are not only the production
costs for the Public Service TV channel but also the lost rents for the private TV
channels and advertisers that lose consumers. These costs have to be compensated
by the benefits from introducing Public Service TV and the additional rents for
consumers. Because of
∆Y1|tp=1 =
1
2
￿
1
tp − ta − (1− ta)
α
￿
=
1
2
￿
1− (1− ta)α+1
1− ta
￿
> 0 (12)
and
∆Y2|tp=1 = 1
α − 1
2
(1− ta)α > 0, (13)
and the fact that the maximum value of ∆Y at t∗p is at least as large as the value of
∆Y at tp = 1, the output for democracy ∆Y is positive for all t∗p. The additional
rents for consumers are positive because consumers switch or do not switch to
Public Service TV by choice. If the positive eﬀects are larger than the negative
eﬀects, the introduction of Public Service TV generates a welfare improvement.
In case private TV channels predominantly broadcast commercials, that is
ta > 1/2, this welfare improvement is generated by a Public Service TV chan-
nel broadcasting information only. The reason for the welfare improvement is
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that information-type consumers watch information not shortened by commer-
cials. Show-type consumers still stay with their preferred private TV channel
that only broadcasts entertainment and commercials and therefore refrain from
watching any information.
However, in most countries the share of commercials is regulated to less than
1/2, that is 0 < ta < 1/2 (Anderson, 2007). In this case, the magnitude of α deter-
mines whether it is worthwhile from a welfare perspective to broadcast shows en-
closing information. Broadcasting shows instead of information attracts additional
showtype consumers and thereby increases aggregate information consumption in
this group of consumers. But it simultaneously decreases aggregate information
consumption within the group of information-type consumers. Since α determines
the rate by which the marginal productivity of information consumption dimin-
ishes, it constitutes the decisive parameter to balance both eﬀects. The lower α the
larger is the positive eﬀect of additional aggregate information consumption within
the group of show consumers compared to the negative eﬀect of lower aggregate
information consumption within the group of information consumers. For a given
ta, α∗ is the value where the positive eﬀect dominates and where it gets worth-
while to broadcast entertaining shows, i.e. t∗s = 1 − 2 ta, as well as information,
t∗p = 2 ta. The welfare improvement in this case is partly generated by subsidizing
the show consumption of the show-type consumers who are willing to watch some
information in return. Decreasing marginal returns of the factor information in
the production process of democracy make it worthwhile to broadcast shows in
exchange for the attention of show consumers whose information consumption is
marginally more productive than that of the information-type consumers.
3 Conclusion
By showing that rational individuals may use a Public Service TV station as
welfare-improving institution to solve the paradox of rationally being uninformed,
we disprove the common argument that Public Service TV should not broadcast a
program that is also provided by private channels. Even though in many markets
most types of programs are covered, Public Service TV stations are not redundant.
Following our results, the optimal Public Service TV broadcasts the soccer
world championships final and uses the half-time interval to broadcast serious
news. The Public Service TV broadcasts special shows targeted to groups usually
not interested in policy concerns to increase their voting attendance (Prat and
Stro¨mberg, 2005) by broadcasting serious news in between the shows.
It is not necessary to have a Public Service Broadcaster to place serious news
into TV shows. Another institutional form could be a Public TV board that
buys informational broadcasts and serious news from private producers and pays
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private TV channels a fee for broadcasting this program instead of commercials.
Which type of institution is optimal depends on the cost eﬃciency of these diﬀerent
institutions and the fixed costs of market entry, which are already sunk for existing
Public Service Broadcasters like BBC or ARD and ZDF.
In any case, Public Service TV has to be independent because politicians do not
aim to solve the voters paradox of rational ignorance but aim to seek re-election
(Prat and Stro¨mberg, 2005) or, as Djankov et al. (2003) concludes his empirical
findings of a large sample of countries, to enrich or empower themselves. Voters
therefore prefer an independent Public Service TV with the aim of improving the
information of voters.
If economists want to contribute to the discussion of how many channels Public
Service TV should oﬀer, how much Public Service TV should spend on sport li-
censes, and whether they also should oﬀer their content in the world wide web, they
have to compare costs and benefits which are the saved costs of bad democratic
decisions. Because empirical literature in economics about the eﬀects of infor-
mation on democratic decisions is scarce, politicians currently rely their decisions
primarily on other social sciences.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
To proof Proposition 1 we use the following Lemmas
Lemma 1 In Region I
∂∆Y1
∂tp
￿ 0 iﬀ tp ￿
(1 + α)ta
α
(14)
Proof: Because
∂∆Y1
∂tp
= −t
α
p (ta + αta − αtp)
2(ta − tp)2
the equation holds:
∂∆Y1
∂tp
= 0 iﬀ tp =
(1 + α)ta
α
. (15)
The second partial derivative
∂2∆Y1
∂tp∂ta
= − (1 + α)t
α
p
2(ta − tp)2 +
tαp (ta + αta − αtp)
(ta − tp)3
=
−(1 + α)(ta − tp)tαp + 2(tαp (ta + αta − αtp))
2(ta − tp)3
(16)
is negative because
−(1+α)(ta−tp)+2(ta+αta−αtp) = ta(−(1+α)+2(1+α))+tp((1+α)−2α) > 0.
The monotonicity of tp = (1− α)ta/α proofs the Lemma. ￿
Lemma 2 In Region II the optimal Public Service TV channel is of type
t∗p =
￿
2ta if ta < 1/2,
1 if ta > 1/2
Proof:
∂∆Y2
∂tp
= αtα−1p > 0.
Lemma 3 For all ta > 1/3 and for all tp3 < 1− ta there exists a 1− ta < tp2 < 2ta
such that ∆Y2(ta, tp2) > ∆Y3(ta, tp3).
Proof:
∆Y2(ta, tp2)−∆Y3(ta, tp3) =
ta(−(1− ta)α + tαp3) + (1− tp3)((1− ta)α − 2tαp2 + tαp3))
2(tp3 − 1) > 0
because
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1. ta(−(1− ta)α + tαp3) < 0
2. ((1− ta)α − tαp2 − tαp2 + tαp3)) < 0
3. 2(tp3 − 1) < 0
￿
Lemma 4 In Region III
∂∆Y3
∂tp
> 0. (17)
Proof:
∂∆Y3
∂tp
=
(α(−1 + tp)2tαp + ta(−(1− ta)αtp + αtαp − (−1 + α)t1+αp ))
(2(−1 + tp)2tp)
which is positive iﬀ
Γ = α(−1 + tp)2tαp − ta(1− ta)αtp + αtatαp + (1− α)tat1+αp > 0
Using the equation
αtat
α
p + (1− α)tat1+αp = tatαp + (1− α)tatp
we calculate
Γ = α(−1 + tp)2tαp − ta(1− ta)αtp + tatαp + (1− α)tatp.
Because (1− ta)α < 1 and tp < tαp it follows
ta(1− ta)αtp < tatαp .
and therefore,
Γ > α(−1 + tp)2tαp − tatαp + tatαp + (1− α)tatp > 0.
￿
Lemma 5 In Region IV, i.e. for all 1 ≤ ta ≤ 1/3 and all 2ta < tp ≤ 1− ta,
∆Y4(ta, 2ta) > ∆Y4(ta, tp)
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Proof:
∆Y4(ta, 2ta) =
(1− ta)αta + 2α(−1 + ta)tαa
−2 + 4ta (18)
Therefore
∆Y4(ta, 2ta)−∆Y4(ta, tp) =
(1− ta)αta + 2α(−1 + ta)tαa
−2 + 4ta −
ta
￿
(1− ta)α + (−1+ta)t
α
p
−ta+tp
￿
2(−1 + tp)
=
2(−1 + tp) ((1− ta)αta + 2α(−1 + ta)tαa )
(−2 + 4ta)2(−1 + tp)
−
(−2 + 4ta)ta
￿
(1− ta)α + (−1+ta)t
α
p
−ta+tp
￿
(−2 + 4ta)2(−1 + tp)
(19)
which is positive if the sum of the enumerators is positive, i.e.
Ψ =2 ((1− ta)αta + 2α(−1 + ta)tαa ) (−1 + tp)
− ta(−2 + 4ta)
￿
(1− ta)α +
(−1 + ta)tαp
−ta + tp
￿
> 0
(20)
Because tp < 1− ta, −1 + ta + tp < 1 holds and therefore
lim
α→1
Ψ =
2(−1 + ta)ta(2ta − tp)(−1 + ta + tp)
ta − tp > 0. (21)
Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that ∂Ψ/∂α < 0 for all 0 ≤ α < 1 to proof the lemma.
∂Ψ
∂α
=− 2(1− ta)αta(2ta − tp)Log[1− ta]
+ 2(−1 + ta)
￿
2αtαa (−1 + tp)Log[2ta] +
ta(−1 + 2ta)tαpLog[tp]
ta − tp
￿ (22)
Because
1. −2(1− ta)αta(2ta − tp)Log[1− ta] < 0
2. 2(−1 + ta) < 0
it is suﬃcient to show that
2αtαa (−1 + tp)Log[2ta] +
ta(−1 + 2ta)tαpLog[tp]
ta − tp > 0
⇐⇒ (ta − tp)(2ta)α(−1 + tp)Log[2ta] < −ta(−1 + 2ta)tαpLog[tp]
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⇐⇒ (tp − ta)(2ta)α(1− tp)Log[2ta] < ta(1− 2ta)tαpLog[tp]
⇐⇒ (tp − ta)(2ta)α(1− tp)Log[2ta] < ta(1− 2ta)tαpLog[tp]
⇐⇒ tp − ta
ta
(2ta)αLog[2ta]
(1− 2ta) <
tαpLog[tp]
(1− tp) .
Let
Φ(x) =
Log[x]
(1− x)
then
∂Φ
∂x
=
(1− x+ xLog[x])
x(x− 1)2 > 0
and therefore
Log[2ta]
(1− 2ta) <
Log[tp]
(1− tp) < 1.
Then it is suﬃcient to show that
(tp − ta)(2ta)α > tαp ta.
For tp > 2ta
2ta
tp
>
ta
tp − ta
and
2ta
tp
<
￿
2ta
tp
￿α
.
It follows that ￿
2ta
tp
￿α
>
ta
tp − ta
or equivalently
(tp − ta)(2ta)α > tαp ta.
￿
Lemma 6
∆Y1(ta, 1− ta) < ∆Y3(ta, 2ta) (23)
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Proof:
∆Y1(ta, 1− ta) = − (1− ta)
αta
−2(1− ta) + 2ta
and
∆Y3(ta, 2ta) =
(1− ta)αta + 2α(−1 + ta)taα
−2 + 4ta .
Because ta < 1/3,
∆Y3(ta, 2ta)−∆Y1(ta, 1− ta) = 2
−1+α(−1 + ta)taα
−1 + 2ta > 0.
￿
Now we can proof Proposition 1:
Let 0 < ta < 1/3. According to Lemma 1 either tp = 1 or tp = 1− ta is optimal
in Region I. According to Lemma 6 tp = 1− ta is dominated by tp = 2ta. Lemma
5 shows that tp = 2ta is optimal in Region IV and, as Lemma 4 shows, in Region
III also. Therefore, either tp = 1 or tp = 2ta is optimal for 0 < ta < 1/3. Let
Ψ = ∆Y3(ta, 2ta)−∆Y1(ta, 1),
then
∂Ψ
∂α
=
(1− ta)α(−1 + 3ta) log[1− ta] + 2α(−1 + ta)tαa log[2ta]
−2 + 4ta < 0,
lim
α→0
Ψ =
1− 2ta
2− 2ta > 0 and limα→1Ψ = −
ta(1− 3ta + t2a)
2− 6ta + 4t2a
< 0.
which proofs the proposition for 0 < ta < 1/3.
Let 1/3 < ta < 1/2. According to Lemma 1 either tp = 1 or tp = 2ta is
optimal in Region I. According to Lemma 3 tp < 1 − ta is dominated by a tp in
Region II. According to Lemma 2 tp = 2ta is optimal in Region II. Therefore, for
1/3 < ta < 1/2 either tp = 1 or tp = 2ta is optimal. Let
Ψ = ∆Y2(ta, 2ta)−∆Y1(ta, 1).
Then
∂Ψ
∂α
= 2αtαa log[2] + 2
αtαa log[ta] < 0,
lim
α→0
Ψ = 1 +
1
2(ta − 1) > 0 and limα→1Ψ = −
(1− 2ta)2
2(ta − 1) < 0,
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which proofs the proposition for 1/3 < ta < 1/2.
Let 1/2 < ta. According to Lemma 3, tp < 1 − ta is dominated by a tp in
Region II. As Lemma 2 states, tp = 1 is optimal in Region II, which proofs the
proposition for 1/2 < ta.
￿
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